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Abstract
Using a newly constructed panel of manufacturing industry data for interwar Norway, we estimate
a long-run wage curve for the 1930s that has all the modern features of being homogeneous in
prices, proportional to productivity, and having an unemployment elasticity of −0.1. This result
is more typical of contemporary European than U.S. wage equations, even if the labour market
in interwar Norway possessed distinctively more ‘American’ features than those associated with
present-day European welfare states. We also present some new Monte Carlo evidence on the
properties of the estimators used.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are two main empirical approaches to the explanation of wage behavior. First, the dynamic
Phillips curve, giving a negative relationship between wage growth and the unemployment rate, has a
prominent role in the empirical literature. The second approach is the dynamic wage curve, which gives
a negative long-run relationship between the wage level and the unemployment rate. The empirical
evidence favours the Phillips curve speciﬁcation for the US, while wage curve speciﬁcations dominate
the European literature. Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1994) in particular have made a strong case for
the wage curve as a general phenomenon. While they also report wage-curve speciﬁcations on US
data, their results are refuted by Blanchard and Katz (1997).
Blanchard and Katz (1997, 1999) provide an elegant attempt at reconciling the conﬂicting evidence
by utilizing the fact that the Phillips curve is nested within the wage-curve speciﬁcation. This makes
it easy to discriminate empirically between the two models. To illustrate their point, consider the
following stylized wage-curve speciﬁed as an error correction model (ECM):
∆wt = c + ∆pct + α∆qt − δut − α[w − pc − q]t−1 + εt, (1)
where the variables are nominal hourly earnings W, labor productivity Q, the unemployment rate
U, and retail prices PC. Lowercase letters denote natural logarithms of the corresponding variables
denoted in capitals, so xt ≡ lnXt and growth rates are given as ∆xt ≡ xt − xt−1. Blanchard and
Katz (1999) argue that
α =( 1− µλ), 0 ·{ µ,λ}·1,
where (1 − λ) is the direct eﬀect of productivity on the expected real wage, and (1 − µ) is the direct
eﬀect of productivity on the reservation wage. Thus, if there are no eﬀects from productivity, so that
µ = λ =1 ,t h eE C M - t e r m[w − pc − q]t−1 drops out and the Phillips-curve speciﬁcation remains.
According to Blanchard and Katz (1999), underlying labor market conditions and institutional
settings are the crucial determinants of wage behavior with systematic structural diﬀerences between
Europe and the United States. Productivity eﬀects on wages are assumed to be higher in Europe than
in the US, which implies a small magnitude of µ and λ. This explains the presence of an ECM-term
in European equations. The small magnitude of µ is related to the greater role of unions and more
stringent hiring and ﬁring regulations in the European labor markets. The smaller European λ could
be caused by a bigger informal sector, although the evidence here is less well documented. A more
general statement is perhaps that λ will be higher the weaker the rights of workers, and that µ will
2be higher the more diverse the total labor market is.
During the depression years of the interwar period, European manufacturing workers were often
in danger of losing their jobs due to business cycle ﬂuctuations. Employment protection and worker
rights in Europe were much weaker than in postwar years, and the social security system was not
nearly as well developed. Alternative employment opportunities in informal labor markets were largely
nonexistent, although some employment could be found in agriculture and ﬁshing, paying subsistence
wages. In many respects, interwar European labor markets possess features that are closer to typical
American labor settings than to present-day European markets. Empirical analysis of European labor
markets in the interwar years may thus provide new and interesting evidence on the two conﬂicting
hypotheses. According to the explanation given by Blanchard and Katz (1999), we should expect to
ﬁnd a Phillips curve rather than a wage curve when looking at European data for the interwar years.
On the other hand, it could be that the wage curve model emerges as the best speciﬁcation. In that
case, other theories are called for to explain the diﬀerences between US and European wage setting.
When looking at evidence to date from the interwar period, the empirical wage equations appear to
be somewhat fragile. For the United Kingdom, Hatton (1988), Dimsdale et al. (1989) and Broadberry
(1986) estimate several wage equations, including a wage-bargain model and a Phillips-curve type of
model, using quarterly time series data, but no empirically well-speciﬁed model was obtained. The
results from other European countries reported by Newell and Symons (1988) are somewhat more in
line with standard wage equations than is the case for Britain, but even here there is only a weak
feedback from unemployment to the real wage. One explanation for these conﬂicting empirical ﬁndings
may be that wage formation in interwar labor markets was indeed diﬀerent from the postwar period,
thus supporting Blanchard and Katz (1999). Data from the United States indicate a change in the
cyclical behavior of real wages between the interwar period and the postwar years.1 This fact does not
necessarily imply that there were changes in the structural parameters of labor demand and supply
equations. Such changes could also stem from diﬀerences in the relative magnitudes of labor demand
and supply shocks in the two time periods.2
Below, we report empirical evidence on interwar wage equations for one European country, Norway,
using GMM estimation methods. Our purpose is twofold: to show that theoretically plausible and
1See Bernanke and Powell (1986) and Hanes (1996) for evidence on the changing cyclicality of real wages.
2On the other hand, Hanes (1996) rejected the hypothesis of relative changes in demand and supply shocks in favour
of an explanation in terms of a shift towards more ﬁnished goods in the consumption bundle of consumers, making the
real consumption wage more procyclical over time.
3empirically sound wage equations can be found for the interwar period, once a more powerful data
set is available and the proper estimation methods are applied. This will then allow us to test the
hypothesis of Blanchard and Katz (1999)–that the existence of a wage curve is dependent upon the
presence of modern ‘European’ type labor market settings.
Most previous studies have been poorly equipped to identify a stable and well identiﬁed relation-
ship, being conﬁned to use the relatively small samples of time series data available for the interwar
years. Even quarterly data, typically over a period of at most 15 years, provide a limited basis for
identifying stable relationships between key variables.3
The novel feature of our approach is to estimate standard wage equations using a panel data set
recently constructed by Klovland (1999) for Norwegian manufacturing. Panel data estimation is likely
to provide more information than time series estimation over a relatively short sample period, since we
can draw inference from the cross-section variation in the data in addition to the time series aspects
of the early 1930s. The data base contains annual values of key output and labor market variables for
55 manufacturing industries over the period 1927 to 1939: nominal average hourly earnings, producer
price indices, labor productivity (real value added per hour) and, at a somewhat less disaggregated
level, unemployment rates.
Section 2 brieﬂy presents the general model, which is suﬃciently general to encompass wage be-
havior in this period. Section 3 reviews some features of interwar labor markets in Norway that are
of speciﬁc relevance to the theories examined here. We report the empirical modelling of the wage
equation for the years 1927 — 1939 in Section 4, focusing on the economic interpretation of the results
as well as methodological issues related to estimation methods. A fuller discussion of the method-
ological issues is contained in Appendix A, where we present some new Monte Carlo evidence on the
properties of the estimators used.
2 The wage equation
A general dynamic speciﬁcation, nesting equation (1), is
(1 − α1L)wit =( β0 + β1L)pit +( γ0 + γ1L)qit
+( δ0 + δ1L)uit +( ζ0 + ζ1L)pct + ηi + εit. (2)
3The fact that Bernanke (1986) obtained quite well-behaved real earnings equations using US monthly manufacturing
data of relatively high quality from the interwar period may indicate that better data may be of some importance.
4The variables are (logs of) nominal hourly earnings w, producer prices p, labor productivity q,t h e
unemployment rate u, and retail prices pc.4 The subscript i denotes the industry, while L is the lag
operator: Lxit = xi,t−1.T h e v a r i a b l e s wit, pit, qit and uit are industry-speciﬁc, while pct captures
economy-wide eﬀects that are not transmitted through the unemployment rate.
Nominal wage growth responds positively to increases in producer and retail prices, labor pro-
ductivity, and negatively to increased unemployment. A natural property of a wage equation is that
in the long run the nominal wage level is homogenous of degree one with respect to the two price
variables (industry-speciﬁc output prices and general retail prices), but that there is some degree of
wage level stickiness in the short run. A key hypothesis, subjected to empirical testing below, is that
productivity growth increases real wages in the same proportion in the long run. The equivalent to
Blanchard and Katz’ model in (1) is the ECM reparameterization of (2):
∆wit = β0∆pit + γ0∆qit + δ0∆uit + ζ0∆pct − α1 (w − w∗)i,t−1 + ηi + εit, (3)
where w∗























= β∗pit + γ∗qit + δ∗ut + ζ∗pct. (4)
Price level homogeneity requires that β∗ + ζ∗ =1 , while the long-run proportionality of labor pro-
ductivity implies γ∗ =1 . Institutional and structural features are reﬂected in the coeﬃcients of (4).
Changes in the impact of institutions on wage setting can therefore be tested by looking at the em-
pirical stability of (4) over the sample period. It is quite likely that wages interact simultaneously
with all the explanatory variables. We do, of course, take the possible simultaneity into account when
estimating the model by using instrumental variables.
3 Some features of the interwar labor market in Norway
After a deﬂationary period in the mid 1920s, Norway was back on the gold standard at the prewar
parity in May 1928.5 Manufacturing output, which is shown in Figure 1, was signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by the international depression beginning in the autumn of 1929. The output level of 1929 was not
surpassed until 1934, but even this ﬁve-year growth pause was a reasonably good performance relative
4We disregard tax rates, which were rather low during the interwar period.
5Klovland (1998) contains some background on the monetary policy in the interwar years.
5to other countries. The fact that Norway followed pound sterling and went oﬀ the gold standard in
September 1931 may be a key factor here, as suggested by the international cross-section analysis
in Eichengreen and Sachs (1985). In the second half of the 1930s manufacturing output recovered
quite well, very much in line with other Scandinavian countries and other Sterling block countries.6
Increasing labor productivity and capital deepening implied that output could expand signiﬁcantly
without leading to any shortage of labor. Although unemployment went down somewhat in the latter
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Figure 1: Indices of manufacturing output and retail prices, 1927-1939. 1929=100.
A general scheme of unemployment insurance for manufacturing workers guaranteed by the gov-
ernment was not established until 1938.7 Before that, only members of trade unions that oﬀered
unemployment schemes were entitled to unemployment beneﬁts. About one third of trade union
members did not have access to such schemes. The amounts paid were low and fairly constant in
real terms, amounting only to about one third of the general wage level in manufacturing. Grytten
(2000, p. 34) concludes that ‘it is not likely that the unemployment beneﬁts paid to insured trade
unionists gave any signiﬁcant incentive to stay unemployed’. Furthermore, the level of unionization
was relatively modest: roughly one in four workers were trade union members. Unorganized workers
and members of unions that did not have unemployment schemes were forced to seek public relief work
in case of unemployment. This was of short duration and poorly paid, being about the same level as
unemployment beneﬁts from trade unions. Thus reservation wages in the manufacturing industries
6See Klovland (1997) for new data on manufacturing output in Norway and some international comparisons.
7Information on labour market instutions is from Grytten (2000).
6were roughly constant at a low level, and apparently not very sensitive to productivity increases, which
















































































Figure 2: Distribution of nominal wages, real wages, wage shares and unemployment in industries per
year.
Figure 2 describes the distributions of diﬀerent wage measures and the unemployment rates across
the 55 manufacturing industries in the years 1927 to 1939 by means of box-and-whisker plots.8 The
distributions of nominal wages remains fairly constant during the depression. The median displays
considerable downward rigidity, rising back towards pre-depression levels in the late thirties. Real
product wages show somewhat more dispersion across industries during depression years–but notably
so in terms of observed high real wages in some industries. Real wage rigidity is even more pronounced
than nominal rigidity. Labor’s share of income also displays the same surprisingly stable pattern over
the period. Hence, if real wages and wage shares did not exhibit any appreciable downward movements,
8The lower and upper limits of the box are the 25 and 75 percentiles, while the horizontal lines inside the box
denotes the median. The whiskers denote the upper and lower adjacent observations. If x75 and x25 are the 75 and
25 percentile observations, then observations bigger than x75+3 /2(x75 − x25) and smaller than x25 − 3/2(x75 − x25)
are outside the adjacent values (and are marked as outside values).
7w ew o u l de x p e c tl a b o rd e m a n dt ov a r yq u i t eal o t–w h i c hi td o e s .T h el o w e rr i g h tp a n e ls h o w sh o w
the unemployment rates increase both in general and across industries as the depression hits the
economy, before unemployment rates fall towards the end of the period. The same impression of a
strong recession is reﬂected in the behavior of retail prices, shown in Figure 1.
Product wage shares











Figure 3: Means ± two standard errors of product wage shares and unemployment rates across
industries over the sample.
The impression of wage rigidity is further reinforced when we compare retail prices with the means
of wage shares and unemployment rates, shown in Figure 3. While retail prices fall heavily, inﬂation
being positive only after 1933, the mean of labor’s share of product income is virtually constant. The
mean of the unemployment rates, on the other hand, nearly doubles from 1930 to 1931.
4 Empirical results
The wage equation (2) is estimated using the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), as well as
the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
Both estimators control for the presence of unobserved industry-speciﬁce ﬀects and for the possible
endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
GMM estimation takes ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the equation to eliminate industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
Endogenous variables in levels lagged two or more periods will then be valid instruments, provided
there is no autocorrelation in the time-varying component of the error term. This can checked by
examining tests for serial correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, following Arellano and Bond
(1991).
In the system GMM estimator, the diﬀerenced equations–using level instruments–are combined
8Table 1: The diﬀerent speciﬁcations considered
GMM instruments Other instruments
Diﬀerenced wit−2,w it−3 ∆pct,∆pct−1,∆pit,∆pit−1,
∆qit,∆qit−1,∆uit,∆uit−1
Diﬀerenced wit−2,w it−3,p it−2,p it−3, ∆pct,∆pct−1
qit−2,q it−3, uit−2,u it−3
Diﬀerenced wit−2,w it−3, ∆wit−1 ∆pct,∆pct−1,∆pit,∆pit−1,
& levels ∆qit,∆qit−1,∆uit,∆uit−1
For levels: pct,pc t−1,p it,p it−1,
qit,q it−1,u it,u it−1
Diﬀerenced wit−2,w it−3,p it−2,p it−3, ∆pct,∆pct−1
& levels qit−2,q it−3, uit−2,u it−3 For levels: pct,pc t−1
∆wit−1,∆pit−1,∆qit−1,∆uit−1
with equations in levels–using diﬀerences as instruments. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that ﬁrst
diﬀerences of the series may be uncorrelated with the industry-speciﬁce ﬀects under stationarity. This
allows the use of lagged diﬀerences as instruments for the levels equation.
In addition to the two types of GMM estimators, we consider two speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst,
productivity qit, producer prices pit, and unemployment uit are treated as exogenous, whereas in the
second they are endogenous. This distinction in terms of classiﬁcation is reﬂe c t e di nt h ec h o i c eo f
instruments, as shown in Table 1. Note that the retail price index is treated as exogenous throughout.
The Appendix provides more detailed examples of the precise form of the instrument matrices. In
each case, the validity of the instruments can be tested by means of the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions. The lag length in the GMM instruments is kept ﬁxed (again see the Appendix) to avoid
overﬁtting, which would remove the eﬀect of instrumental variables estimation.
4.1 Empirical wage equations
The estimated wage equations using the diﬀerent speciﬁcations are reported in Table 2. The results
are obtained with Ox version 3.2 (see Doornik, 1999) and the DPD package (Doornik et al., 1999).
In each case, two-step estimaton is used, while the reported standard errors and test statistics are
asymptotically robust to general heteroskedasticity, see Windmeijer (2000).
9Table 2: Wage equations, GMM estimates
Dep. var: wit Diﬀerences Diﬀerences & levels










































































Sargan test: χ2 (·) 38.01∗∗ (20) 53.49(77) 50.97∗ (31) 52.62(121)
AR(1) test: N (0,1) −1.38 −2.54∗ −3.97∗∗ −4.05∗∗
AR(2) test: N (0,1) −1.40 −1.37 0.49 0.17
Steady-state analysis: w∗


































β∗ + ζ∗ =1 12.61∗∗ 16.90∗∗ 0.28 0.41
β∗ + ζ∗ =1 ,
γ∗ =1 128.09∗∗ 46.39∗∗ 13.97∗∗ 0.95
β∗ + ζ∗ =1 ,
γ∗ =1 ,δ∗ = −0.1 246.30∗∗ 102.33∗∗ 27.16∗∗ 1.80
10All speciﬁcations seem to capture the relevant dynamics, since no second order residual correla-
tion is evident. The system estimators produce more reasonable estimates than the ﬁrst diﬀerence
estimators. The diﬀerences are in particular striking for the autoregressive term, with the estimated
parameter being notably higher using the system estimators. This is consistent with the analysis of
Blundell and Bond (1998). They show that in autoregressive models with persistent series, the ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced estimator can be subject to serious ﬁnite sample biases as a result of weak instruments,
and that these biases can be greatly reduced by the inclusion of the levels equations in the system
estimator. This result is in particular relevant in the present setting, where the degree of nominal wage
rigidity is measured by the autoregressive parameter. The system estimator is therefore preferred.
However, in the Monte Carlo experiments reported by Blundell and Bond (1998) only a purely
autoregressive process is considered, whereas a more realistic situation would be cases like the present
analysis with additional variables. To gain some further insight into the properties of the diﬀerent
estimators before we proceed, we therefore conduct a Monte Carlo experiment, using a simpliﬁed data
generating process more relevant for the analysis at hand. The results of the experiment are reported
in the Appendix, and they clearly indicate that the system estimator is favored over the diﬀerence
estimator–the latter being severely downward biased for the coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent
variable.
A ﬁnal issue relates to the exogeneity assumptions. The exogeneity of the explanatory variables qit,
pit and uit is rejected by the Sargan tests, with p-values of 0.008 and 0.0134, respectively. This again
supports the system estimator with endogenous regressors, which is now our preferred speciﬁcation.
4.2 The steady state
As argued in the introduction, the crucialh y p o t h e s i st ob et e s t e di st h es i g n i ﬁcance of the parameters
of the long-run solution (4)
wit = β∗pit + γ∗qit + δ∗ut + ζ∗pct.
The hypothesis of long-run price homogeneity, β∗+ζ∗ =1 ,i sr e j e c t e di nb o t hd i ﬀerenced speciﬁcations,
using the approach of Bårdsen (1989). On the other hand, the system models do not reject the
hypothesis. Adding the restriction of proportionality of productivity, γ∗ =1 , we see that this is only
accepted by the system speciﬁcation with endogenous regressors. Clearly, the bias problems of the
other speciﬁcations have a large impact on their steady-state estimates. In the remainder we will only
consider our preferred model based on the system speciﬁcation with endogenous regressors.
11The evidence presented in Table 2 does not lend any support to the hypothesis that the existence
of a wage curve is dependent upon ‘modern European’ features of the labor market. Instead it seems
to be the data variation that traces out the wage curve. The variability of the unemployment rates,























Figure 4: Recursive estimates of the steady-state parameters ± two standard errors.
Given the turbulence of the period that we are investigating, a relevant question is whether this
wage curve is indeed a genuine relationship, or just eﬀects that happened to dominate at the end of
our sample in 1939. To answer this question we estimate the steady-state solution recursively, also see
Johansen (1999). Figure 4 shows that all parameters remain stable across the 1930s, with the exception
of the eﬀect of retail prices, which is insigniﬁcant until the latter part of the sample. Whether this
eﬀect is due to lack of cross-section variation is an issue that remains to be investigated. We do note,
however, that the eﬀect of retail prices is the parameter most invariant across speciﬁcations.
The eﬀect of unemployment on wages is another important issue when analyzing the interwar labor
market. Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1994) in particular claim to have found an empirical law stating
that the unemployment elasticity of wages is −0.1, so a doubling of unemployment reduces wages by
10%. We cannot reject this hypothesis on the basis of our model. The test of the joint hypothesis
12Table 3: Wage equations, GMM system estimates




















Sargan: χ2 () 53.39(110) 54.09(50)
AR(1) −4.01∗∗ −3.74∗∗
AR(2) −0.07 −0.18
of a long-run wage curve being homogeneous in prices, proportional to productivity, and having an
unemployment elasticity of −0.1, produces a statistic with a p-value of 0.27.
Finally we impose the steady-state solution
wit =0 .5pit + qit − 0.1ut +0 .5pct (5)
χ2(4) = 1.81[0.77].
The associated p-value in brackets suggests that this empirical representation of (4) cannot be re-
jected. It is therefore imposed when we next turn to estimating the dynamic speciﬁcation in the error
correction form given by (3).9
4.3 The dynamic model
We have found a theoretically plausible and empirically sound wage equations for the interwar period
in Norway, rejecting the hypothesis of Blanchard and Katz (1999) that the existence of a wage curve
is dependent upon the presence of modern ‘European’ type labor market settings. The next question
is whether the short-run adjustment of wages during the interwar period diﬀered from what is found
in empirical studies of the postwar period. We could ﬁnd no such evidence. Our preferred equation is
a quite standard dynamic wage equation, with properties matching those found in comparable studies
9Note that solving for the NAIRU is not possible without further identifying restrictions–see Bårdsen and Nymoen
(2003) for the details.
13of the Norwegian economy during the postwar era. The relevant evidence is reported in Table 3.
Column (1) contains the general model reparameterized in error correction form, with the long-run
solution (5) imposed. The short-run eﬀects of producer prices and unemployment are insigniﬁcant
and can be dropped–the joint test statistic has a p-value of 0.31. This is of course in accordance with
the corresponding results in Table 1. The ﬁnal model is reported in column (2).10 There is substantial
nominal rigidity, as measured by the ECM coeﬃcient with a value of −0.26.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,ad r o pi n
inﬂation is not likely to be reﬂected in a similar drop in wage growth, as documented by the coeﬃcient
of 0.6 on inﬂation. These magnitudes are similar to the evidence from time-series studies using recent
Norwegian manufacturing data by Nymoen (1989) and Johansen (1995), as well as the panel studies
of Johansen (1996) and Wulfsberg (1997).
It might again be argued that perhaps such results dominate in the latter half of the sample, as
Norway recovered from the great depression, instead of reﬂecting actual behavior during the depressed
years in the early 1930s. To investigate this possibility we complete the analysis with recursive
estimation of our preferred equation in column (2). The estimated coeﬃcients, together with their
approximate conﬁdence bands, are shown in Figure 5, starting from 1932. The coeﬃcients display
considerable stability over time, although there is some downward drift in the coeﬃcient on the retail
price inﬂation until 1935. Otherwise there is little evidence of changing behavior during the sample
period.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Our empirical analysis does not lend any support to the hypothesis of Blanchard and Katz (1999)–
that the presence of a wage curve is due to relatively strong worker rights and alternative labor
markets. In the case of Norwegian manufacturing industries during the interwar years, the preferred
steady-state wage equation features the standard properties of homogeneity with respect to prices
and productivity, and there is an unemployment elasticity of -0.1. We also ﬁnd much inertia in the
dynamics of nominal wages. These results contrast with much of the empirical ﬁndings from other
countries; such studies often report diﬃculties with replicating the standard postwar wage models on
interwar data. We believe this result mainly stems from the fact that we are able to use a panel
data set of 55 manufacturing industries in our econometric analysis, rather than having to rely on a
relatively short time series sample.
10The change in coeﬃcients partly reﬂects changes in the list of instruments.




















Figure 5: Recursive estimates of the model parameters ± two standard errors.
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17A A simulation experiment of the properties of the estimators
The homoskedastic DGP in Arellano and Bond (1991) is:
yit = αyi,t−1 + βzi1 + ηi + vit, ηi ∼ N[0,1] vit ∼ N[0,1]
i =1 ,...,N, t=1 ,...,T
zit = ρzi,t−1 + eit,e it ∼ N[0,σ2
e].
This DGP is used in Doornik et al. (1999) to illustrate how the system GMM estimator (Sys)g i v e s
more precise estimates of the autoregressive parameter α than the diﬀerenced GMM estimator (Diﬀ )
when α is close to unity. It was also noted that Diﬀ underestimates α,w h e r e a sSys produces an
overestimate. While Doornik et al. (1999) keep β ﬁxed at unity, we now proceed to keep α ﬁxed at
0.9, and vary β.W es e tN = 100,a n dT =7(5 after allowing for lags and diﬀerences).
The two estimators can be summarized as:
transformation regressors instruments estimation
Diﬀ ∆∆ yi,−1,∆xi,1 diag(yi,t−3yi,t−2),∆xi,1 1-step
Sys ∆∆ yi,−1,∆xi diag(yi,t−3yi,t−2),∆xi 1-step
levels: yi,−1,xi,1 diag(∆yi,t−2),xi,1
When T =5 , for example, the instruments Z in Diﬀ estimation are:
Zi =
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
yi0 0000 ∆xi,2 1
0 yi0 yi1 00 ∆xi,3 1
000 yi1 yi2 ∆xi,4 1
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
.
This assumes that initially the available observations are t =0 ,...,4. One observation is lost owing
to the lagged dependent variable, and one more by diﬀerencing. For Sys estimation the instruments




⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
yi0 0000 ∆xi,2
0 yi0 yi1 00 ∆xi,3
000 yi1 yi2 ∆xi,4
⎞






⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
∆yi1 00 xi,2 1
0 ∆yi2 0 xi,3 1
00 ∆yi3 xi,4 1
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
Some results for M = 1000 Monte Carlo replications are presented in Figure 6. MCSD is the
standard deviation of the estimated ˆ α. The results can be compared with Table 1 of Arellano and
Bond (1991) (but we use instruments t − 2,t− 3 instead of all possible lags from t − 2 onwards), and
Table 2 of Blundell and Bond (1998) (but with larger T, and an additional regressor).














Figure 6: Mean bias of ˆ α, M = 1000,α =0 .9,ρ =0 .8,σ2
e =0 .9;b a r sa r et w i c et h eM C S D ;β =
0,0.1,0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9,1.
The results are dramatic. Despite the fact that the generated x is kept constant in replications,
the bias of the Diﬀ estimator is enormous for small values of β; for example when β =0 .3,t h em e a n
estimated ˆ α is close to 0.5. Sys again overestimates α, but is much better behaved. These results
shed some light on Table 2: the large discrepancy between the Diﬀ and Sys results reported there
corresponds to a low value of β in Figure 6.
The bias in ˆ β is never so dramatic, ranging from about 0.01 to −0.04 for Diﬀ,a n df r o m0.01 to
−0.08 for Sys.
BT h e D a t a
The wage, price and productivity series are annual data 1927 - 1939 for 55 manufacturing industry
groups, see Klovland (1999) for further details as to coverage and sources. The unemployment data
are taken from Grytten (1994). These are only available at a more aggregated level; data for 11
industry groups were distributed on the 55 subgroups. The retail price index is taken from Historical
Statistics 1948 (Statistics Norway, Oslo, 1949).
The data deﬁnitions are:
W = nominal hourly earnings Average hourly earnings of (male and female) production
workers, calculated as total wage sum divided by hours worked by production workers.
P = producer prices Paasche price index of industry gross output, shifting base year every
third year.
Q = labor productivity Real industry value added divided by total hours worked. Total hours
19also include an estimate of hours worked by non-production workers.
U = unemployment rate based on unemployed registered at public labor exchanges, classiﬁed
by industry groups.
PC = retail price index
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